Non-technical summary (500 words): There has long been controversy over the extent to which economic growth will reduce poverty. Some argue for "redistribution with growth" while others claim growth will "trickle down". In postreform China, governments have tended to emphasise the primacy of growth, as expressed in Deng Xiao-Ping's maxim "Let some get rich first". However, whilst rapid growth has been achieved, it is often claimed that this has been coupled with the creation of a "new urban poverty". A key concern has been with the distributional consequences of retrenchment within State Owned Enterprises and the resulting emergence of mass unemployment. The current Chinese government appears to have responded to these concerns by stressing the importance of a "harmonious society" rather than simply maximising economic growth. This paper examines recent trends using the 1988 to 2002 Chinese Household Income Project (CHIP) surveys. These surveys are representative of all urban residents in China and provide the most detailed accounting of income available. A limitation of the data is the omission of most rural-urban migrants from the surveys.
Regardless of where the poverty line is set, it is clear that absolute poverty did fall over this period. The lower end of the income distribution has enjoyed rising real incomes. This is something of a paradox, given the emergence of large-scale unemployment in urban China after 1995. The explanation of this paradox is that the adverse effects of unemployment have been outweighed by strong rises in urban wages.
It is true that the incomes of the poor have risen less than those of others. But this much remarked upon rise in inequality occurred mainly in the period 1988-1995 as a result of the withdrawal of various subsidies and transfers. Since that time, inequality is shown has been relatively constant.
Income sources are decomposed to isolate the contribution of various anti-poverty programs -redundancy benefits, unemployment insurance and Minimum Living Standard. These programs are show to have little impact on poverty, which has fallen almost entirely due to overall economic growth rather than such redistributive measures.
Many income differentials have widened from 1988 to 2000. Differentials by education have grown, although are still fairly modest by international standards. The gender gap has widened. Communist Party members have also enjoyed an increased premium, although this trend appears to have gone into reverse since 1999.
From our analysis, urban China is growing out of poverty, at least when defined in absolute terms. However, there are several important caveats to this conclusion. First, our results apply only to registered urban residents, since most migrants are excluded from official surveys. Second, we do find that some inequalities have widened and that relative poverty has increased. Finally, we refer back to our findings on the ineffectiveness of government anti-poverty programs in reducing urban poverty. The government in China might be said to have gambled by heavily relying on economic growth to resolve many social problems including poverty reduction. One wonders what will happen if growth stops?
Introduction
There is widespread debate over the relative role of economic growth and public redistribution in poverty reduction. After experiences such as the very inegalitarian growth of Brazil observed by Fishlow (1972) , an international consensus evolved in the 1970s for "redistribution with growth". However, the 1980s saw the pendulum swing the other way, with a renewed emphasis being put on economic growth as central to poverty reduction. This stance was partly due to a belated recognition of the pro-poor growth of high performing East Asian economies (HPAEs) and the contrast with the crises in economically stagnant Latin America and Africa. Although the debate on redistribution and growth hinges partly on value judgements (for example, one's degree of inequality aversion), it is clear that country experiences of how economic growth is actually distributed have been very influential in shaping opinion.
Cross-country experiences after 1960 imply that, on average, economic development does not have a systematic effect on inequality (Fields, 1991) . Since there is no systematic tendency for inequality to change during growth, it follows that, on average, one should expect growth to tend to raise the incomes of the poor on a onefor-one basis. Again, cross-country evidence since 1960 supports this implication (Dollar and Kraay, 2000) . However, these summary conclusions relate only to crosscountry averages and do not constitute an "iron law". In practice, as the contrasting experiences of Brazil and the East Asian HPAEs show, country experiences may deviate substantially from the norm.
The case of China is a particularly interesting one, not only because it is home to so many of the world's poor. Since the start of economic reforms 1978, it has enjoyed exceptionally rapid economic growth and the emphasis on government redistribution has been greatly reduced. The official stance is close to the "trickle down" theories emphasised in the 1980s: in the words of Deng Xiao-Ping, "let some get rich first". In the interests of promoting economic efficiency and hence growth, enterprises have been given more freedom in letting worker remuneration reflect productivity, excess workers in stated owned enterprises have been made unemployed and many state transfers have been removed. As Khan (1998) argues, post-reform, the Chinese government has tended to reject a "relief approach" to poverty reduction in favour of efforts to increase income generation. Indeed, Khan suggests that the reluctance of the Chinese government to adopt a redistributive approach to poverty reduction may partly be a backlash against the extreme egalitarianism of the planning period.
Clearly, the efficacy of China's current strategy of emphasising economic growth over redistribution depends partly on the extent to which growth has actually reduced poverty.
We focus on poverty in urban China. For a long time, this topic was neglected by policy-makers and researchers. Government anti-poverty programs focussed on rural areas and, in particular, on selected poor counties. As Khan (1998, p42) commented "China's official poverty reduction strategy is based on the assumption that poverty is a rural problem." Within academia, few studies focussed on urban poverty, in contrast to the large literature on income distribution and inequality more generally.
This neglect of urban poverty arose partly from using low poverty lines -such as a "dollar a day". Reflecting the great urban-rural divide in China (Knight and Song, 1999) , a significant proportion of the rural population fell below these poverty lines but only 1% of the urban population were classified poor. With urban poverty in China being defined so as to concern only a very small minority, it is scarcely surprising that the issue was marginalised by government and scholars alike.
Things began to change in the second half of the 1990s with concern over what was seen as a "new urban poverty" caused partly by a wave of rural-urban migration and partly by mass unemployment following a program of retrenchment in state owned enterprises. These new forms of urban poverty differed from the old urban poverty which was often characterised as the "three withouts" -roughly corresponding to the disabled, the sick and the orphaned (Wong, 1998) . By the turn of the century, opinion makers began to assert that urban poverty had risen during the 1990s, taking some of the shine off China's exceptionally high rates of economic growth. For example, The Economist (2001, page 39) declared "And in the cities, absolute poverty is increasing…" while the Chinese government magazine Liaowang (27 June 2002) also argued that urban poverty had increased. Underpinning such commentary was a concern that rising urban poverty would lead to political unrest, jeopardising the reforms that had enabled China's rapid economic growth (see Wu, 2004) . However, urban poverty in China continued to be measured using low poverty lines such as "a dollar a day" that, despite perceived adverse developments, still only categorised around 1% of the urban population as poor.
In this paper, we use a range of higher poverty lines in order to consider more broadly how lower income urban households fared in the 1990s. We present new evidence based on the best available data-set on income distribution in China spanning the period from 1988 to 2002. We find that concern over adverse poverty trends in the 1990s appear misplaced. There has perhaps been an over-reaction to the previous neglect of urban poverty in China, with unwarranted pessimism about the living standards of poorer households. In particular, we challenge the assertion that urban poverty rose in absolute terms. While this claim makes dramatic headlines, it is does not appear to be supported by the evidence.
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 reviews the small existing literature on trends in urban poverty in China. Our own findings on trends in growth, inequality and poverty are documented in Section 3. Section 4 shows the results of decomposing changes in absolute poverty, focussing on the roles of economic growth, unemployment and government anti-poverty measures. Section 5 uses multivariate analysis to explore the patterns of poverty in the four different surveys we analyse.
Section 6 summarises and concludes.
Existing estimates of trends in urban poverty
There are relatively few studies of urban poverty in China and these present seemingly contradictory conclusions on trends from 1988 to 2002. We confine ourselves to monetary measures of poverty, based on the use of household income or consumption as welfare measures, although we do not dispute that poverty can be viewed more broadly as having many dimensions (World Bank, 2001) . Table 1 compiles estimates of the headcount of the urban poor made by these studies of monetary poverty. Some studies report that poverty has increased in the 1990s, others that it has shown no trend and yet more that that it has fallen. In this section, we review these studies and attempt to adjudicate between them. The task of adjudication is made somewhat easier by the fact that all rely on one of two main sources of dataeither the official NBS household survey results or the CHIP surveys used in this paper. We argue that the CHIP data is preferable due to its fuller accounting of income but it is not clear that a difference in data accounts for the conflicting results on poverty trends. As previously discussed, both data sources cover only residents with urban registration hukou and so exclude most rural-urban migrants.
Poverty analysis using the CHIP surveys has been restricted to a comparison of their results for 1988 and 1995 (Khan, 1998; Khan and Riskin, 2001 The other studies using NBS data adopt poverty lines that are fixed in real terms but produce no consensus on poverty trends when using poverty lines are set to be very low. Two studies find no strong trend. Fang et al. (2002) used a subset of the NBS data -one representative city from each province. Chen and Wang (2002) 
3.
New evidence on trends in poverty, inequality and growth
Data and measurement
This paper uses the Chinese Household Income Project surveys conducted by the Economics Institute, CASS, in 1988 , 1995 , 1999 (Riskin, Zhao and Li, 2001 ). The surveys use sub-samples from the main nationally representative household survey programme conducted by the government National Bureau of Statistics. As a result, the surveys are reasonably large and designed to be representative of urban China 1 . However, in practice, Chinese urban surveys cover only residents with urban registration (hukou), and so exclude rural-urban migrants 2 .
A key strength of the CHIP surveys is that they provide a more comprehensive and accurate assessment of household income than official NBS data (see Khan et al, 1993) . Our measure of income follows the conventions proposed by Khan (1993) and as such has two differences from those used by the NBS and some other studies 3 .
First, it includes the value of various state transfers and subsidies that were particularly important in 1988. Since these transfers have been eroded, excluding them and focussing on private earnings would risk overestimating income growth and poverty reduction. The most important elements of these transfers in 1988 were food subsidies through the coupon system and housing subsidies. Second, it includes an estimate of imputed income from the rent of owner occupied housing. Rents rose during the 1990s, implying that a bias from their omission in the NBS estimates that is in the opposite direction to that from omitting subsidies. To adjust for changes in prices, we use the official province specific urban CPI figures. These allow for regional variations in prices.
There is no official urban poverty line in China as yet, although separate poverty lines have been set for various cities in order to determine eligibility for benefits (Minimum Living Support). As discussed in the previous section, studies of urban poverty have tended to use poverty lines based around calorific requirements and tend to find only a very small proportion of the population to be poor. For example, Ravallion and Chen (2004) estimate that less than 0.5% of the urban population fell under their poverty line in 2001. Khan (1998, p8) criticises the "dismally low poverty threshold" as China prospers and industrialises, a narrow calorie-based poverty line becomes inappropriate. In this paper, we provide some estimates of poverty based on $2 and $3 a day poverty lines (using 1985 PPP dollars). These lines are ultimately arbitrary but arguably more informative than lines which pertain to less than 1% of the urban population.
Some heat can be taken out of the debate over where to set the poverty line by "dominance analysis" -that is to say plotting poverty incidence curves against multiples of the poverty line to see if poverty comparisons are robust to the location of the poverty line (see Ravallion, 1992 , for a discussion; Figure 2 and the surrounding discussion late in this paper provide an application here). As conventionally performed, dominance analysis requires that the poverty line is fixed in real termsthat is to say, the poverty line is an absolute one, rather than being a relative line that moves with average living standards. We adopt such an absolute concept of poverty in this paper and indeed this is central to our subsequent findings. We do not deny that poverty has an irredeemably relative aspect -indeed this is implicit in our preference for a $2 or $3 poverty line for urban China over a $1 or calorific line. Consequently, we also estimate the extent of poverty using a relative poverty line -specifically, half of median income in the year of the survey. Nonetheless, our central interest is in whether the urban poor have benefited materially from China's economic growth and an absolute concept of poverty is required to answer this question.
An important caveat to our argument is that the CHIP surveys on which we base our estimates of urban poverty are based on the government's official sampling frame.
This has the advantage of making our samples representative of all Chinese with urban registration (hukou). However, it excludes the "floating population" of ruralurban migrants who lack urban hukous. This omission is regrettable since rural-urban migration increased dramatically in the period and rural-urban migrants were no doubt poorer as a group than residents with urban hukou. Nonetheless, all large-scale statistical studies of urban poverty in China in the period are subject to the same limitation as a result of the government's failure to properly cover rural-urban migrants in its official statistics. The planned next round of the CHIP surveys will explicitly include migrants, but for now researchers are limited by the data available.
For brevity, we will not continuously repeat this caveat and use the term "urban poverty" in this paper to refer to poverty rates among those with urban hukou. While important equity issues arise when considering rural-urban migrants -notably in their lack of access to government services compared to urban residents -there is no real suggestion that migrants as a group have impoverished themselves by moving to the cities. If any thing, the presumption is that migration has provided a means by which they can escape poverty (Park, Du and Wang, 2004) . What data we have on ruralurban migrants in 1999 shows that unemployment rates among them are negligible (Appleton et al. 2002) . By contrast, the second half of the 1990s saw the emergence of mass unemployment among residents with urban hukous. Employees in loss-making State Owned Enterprises found themselves laid-off and enduring long spells of unemployment (Knight and Song, 2005) . If one is to look for potential losers from China's reform process, our focus on the urban residents rather than the migrants seems appropriate. This is important, as some studies of income inequality in China focus more narrowly on cash wage earnings. Neglecting to account for subsidies and in-kind, which have been largely withdrawn after 1988, will tend to overstate the rise in income during the period. In our data, the share of cash earnings by working household members has rose from 43% of all household income in 1988 to 60% in 2002.
Trends in growth and inequality
The more inclusive measure of income in the CHIP surveys probably explains the discrepancy between the growth estimates from that data compared to those from the larger household surveys conducted by the NBS. NBS data imply higher growth during the period -6.8% per annum compared to 5.1% (Table 3 refers The focus of this paper is not on the average level of growth, but how growth has varied across the distribution of income and hence the impact on poverty and inequality. Table 4 reports income per capita at each decile; Figure 1 plots the implied annualised growth rates. The CHIP data show that income growth between 1988 and 2002 is greater, the higher up the income distribution one goes. We have already noted that average incomes virtually doubled in the period. However, for the lowest decile, the 10 th percentile, real income per capita only increased by a half (49% higher). For the highest decile, the 90th percentile, incomes increased by 130%. As a consequence, growth rates for the highest decile averaged 6.0% per annum, more than twice the 2.8% growth experienced by the poorest decile.
The interval between the first survey in 1988 and the second in 1995 is largely what accounts for the unequal pattern of growth over the full period. Between 1988 and 1995, incomes of the poor grew slowly: the poorest decile saw only slow growth in income in this early period (0.8% per annum). By contrast, the top decile enjoyed very fast growth of 6.1% per annum. In the subsequent intervals between surveys, the pattern of growth across the deciles is much flatter and less marked. It is true that the growth is slower at the poorest three deciles than at the median -but the differences are more muted -particularly in the latest episode, 1999 to 2002. Income growth for the most affluent decile is also below the median in these intervals.
The fact that income grew less for poorer deciles than for more affluent ones implies an increase in inequality. This is demonstrated in Table 5 Looking at the numbers in more detail, there is a modest rise in inequality between 1995 and 1999. There is outweighed by a fall in inequality between 1999 and 2002.
The fall in inequality between the last two surveys is perhaps surprising given the evidence in Figure 1 that the poorer deciles experienced growth below the median.
However this is outweighed by the fact that the most affluent also enjoyed below average growth.
Poverty trends
The fact that incomes grew across the deciles implies that absolute poverty fell, so long as a reasonably broad poverty line is used. Figure 2 provides figures for the percentage of urban residents who are poor for a continuum of poverty lines. The poverty incidence curve for 2002 is below those for earlier years. This implies that the conclusion that absolute poverty has fallen is robust to the choice of poverty line.
Measuring poverty simply in terms of the headcount of the poor is inadequate -we might refer to a wider class of poverty indicators, the P-alpha measures proposed by Foster, Greer and Thorbecke (1984) , of which the headcount is merely one (that when alpha equals zero). However, one corollary of the "first order" dominance revealed in (Table 6 refers). With the $2 poverty line, the prevalence of poverty falls from 7.3% to 2.1%.
Poverty also falls between each of the surveys for most poverty lines. The most noticeable case where the poverty incidence curves in Figure 2 cross is when comparing poverty in 1988 and 1995. Here, for low poverty lines that identify less than 6% of people as poor in 1988, we can see that poverty is higher in 1995 than in
1988. This implies that living standards worsened for the poorest 5% of the population between 1988 and 1995. This helps to understand the finding in Table 6 that, using the $2 a day poverty line, the poverty gap, P1, and the squared poverty gap, P2, are estimated to rise between 1988 and 1995. (going from 11.8% to 12.8%).
Decomposing changes in absolute poverty
Further insight into trends in recent poverty trends can be given by various decompositions. In this section, we use various decompositions to quantify the role of growth in poverty reduction; to explain the paradox of poverty reduction during the emergence of mass unemployment; and to gauge the effectiveness of China's social security system.
Decomposition of poverty changes into growth and distribution components
The problem with focussing on relative poverty is that by construction it does not allow changes in average income to impact on poverty -relative poverty can only change if the distribution of incomes changes. However, it is growth alone rather than redistribution that has raised the living standards of the poor in this period. Since inequality has risen, the distributional changes have been unfavourable to the poor. Table 7 decomposes the change in poverty into growth and redistribution components following Datt and Ravallion (1992) . Under this decomposition, we start by describing a poverty measure t P in terms of the poverty line, z , its mean income, t µ , and t L , a vector of parameters fully representing the income distribution curve. A change in poverty over dates t and t n + is then decomposed as follows:
Where the growth, G, and the redistribution, D, components are calculated as: Table 7 shows that the distributional changes in income in the period have generally been unfavourable -as should be expected from the rise in inequality noted in Table   5 . More revealingly, the impact on poverty of adverse distributional changes is estimated to have been substantial. For example, Table 7 
Sectoral decomposition: the paradox of rising unemployment and falling poverty
Perhaps the most surprising aspect of our results is that poverty in absolute terms has fallen at the same time as mass unemployment has emerged. for other reasons (e.g. attending domestic duties). Given these mutually exclusive groups, it is possible to decompose the overall change in the proportion living in poverty into the effects of changes in poverty within the groups and changes in the size of each group (Ravallion and Huppi, 1991) . Specifically, if P t is the total poverty indicator at time t and P it the corresponding indicator for those belonging to a group i, then:
P T -P 0 = Σ (P iT -P i0 )n i0 intra-group effects + Σ (n iT -n i0 )P i0 inter-group effects + Σ(P iT -P i0 )(n iT -n i0 ) interaction effects where n it is the proportion of the population in group i at time t. The interaction effects would be positive if people moved into groups where poverty was falling.
The impact of the program of lay-offs in the state sector in the second half of the 1990s is shown in the population shares of the various groups in Table 8 . In 1995, only 0.4% of individuals in the sample lived in households headed by an unemployed worker. In 2002, this percentage had risen to 6.2%. Perhaps even more revealingly, the proportion living in households with employed heads fell from 80% to 71%.
Although one might expect some increase in the proportion living in households with retired heads due to an ageing of the population, our figures are consistent with some of the retrenchment in China having taken the form of early retirement rather than unemployment per se.
Other things being equal, the emergence of mass unemployment would be expected to increase poverty. This is born out by the contribution of the population shifts shown in Table 8 . For example, Table 8a uses the "two dollar a day" line. The results imply that the poverty headcount would have increased by 1.3 points, from its 1995 level of 7%.
However, this is more than offset by falls in poverty rates within groups. For example, the fall in the headcount among those living in households with employed heads would imply a 4.1 point drop in the poverty headcount. This alone would account for four-fifths of the observed fall in poverty. Moreover, the interaction effects also imply falls in poverty because the groups that have grown in size -those headed by the unemployed and the retired -have also experienced the fastest reduction in poverty.
The results are qualitatively similar when using the three dollar a day line, as in Table   8b .
Perhaps the most important reason why the rise in unemployment is not as disastrous as might be thought is because only a minority of households headed by the unemployed are absolutely poor. For example, just 7% of people in households headed by the unemployed have incomes of less than $2 per head per day in 2002. This is only a small minority, even if it is substantially above the 2% headcount for all urban people. If $3 a day was used as the poverty line, 22% of those in households headed by the unemployed would be poor. These figures are all the more remarkable because our poverty rates are measured by income, rather than consumption. Clearly, households with unemployed heads are finding sources of income other than their heads earnings to support themselves. This income is partly earnings from the spouse of the head (or other family members). In this respect, the high rates of female employment in urban China should be acknowledged.
The effectiveness of China's social safety network
The Chinese Government believed that a universal welfare provisional system would assist in allowing it to pursue State sector reforms aimed at enhancing efficiency and promoting growth. Such a system would transfer the financial burdens of welfare provision from State enterprises and would pave the way to further retrench State workers in the coming years. However, the decentralised fiscal system could not support a nationwide universal welfare system. Consequently, local -not centralgovernments have become the main players in welfare provision and they are also joined by firms in both State and private sectors.
The CHIP data allows us to identify three kinds of welfare payment: payment made 
Patterns of poverty and inequality -multivariate analysis
We have documented the fall in absolute poverty among urban residents in China or not (where poverty is defined as income per capita of less than $3 per day for this purpose). The third estimation method is more unconventional: it censors household income per capita at the poverty line ($3 per day) and uses a tobit to estimate the determinants of the log of this censored income variable. This third method forms abridge between the more usual OLS and probit models -like the probit, it models one measure of poverty (the gap between household income and the poverty line), but it does so in a way that produces coefficients comparable to those of the OLS model of income.
Using these three estimation methods, we specify two kinds of model: reduced form models and full models. The reduced form models use a parsimonious set of variables capturing the human capital of the household head, household demographics and provincial dummy variables. The full models augment the reduced form models with dummy variables for the work-related characteristics of the household headspecifically, occupation, industrial sector and ownership sector. The reduced form models are interesting because they are likely to provide more comprehensive estimates of the effects of some variables -for example, education may affect income via occupation, so controlling for occupation will underestimate the overall effects.
However, the full models are also useful in describing associations between workrelated characteristics and outcomes.
Reduced form results -human capital and demographics
Income differentials have widened over time by a variety by characteristics of the household head. The Table 10 There are also some differences in the effect of the sex of the household head. This never significantly affects the probability of being poor in the probits. While coming from a male-headed household does appear to be a significant advantage in the OLS model in 2002, this is not true for the Tobit -although the reverse could be said of 1988 (when it is significant in the Tobit but not the OLS).
Full models -the effect of job-characteristics
We now turn to the "full models" which include various characteristics of the household head's job -namely, occupation, ownership and industrial sector. Including these characteristics tends to reduce the estimated effects of some of the other characteristics of the head -such as their education and CCP membership. However, the trends discussed above remain robust to inclusion of job-characteristics. We begin by discussing the effects of job characteristics on the OLS models of household income.
As Table 11 shows, ceteris paribus, those employed in foreign firms had significantly higher household incomes while those in private enterprises had significantly lower income. However, these differentials narrowed between 1988 and 2002. Conversely, the income gap between households whose heads worked in urban collectives widened over time, so that by 2002, this was appeared the least remunerative ownership sector to work in.
Income differentials between household heads who were manual workers tended to widen over time. For example, professionals and clerks more than doubled their apparent advantage over manual workers between 1988 and 2002. Households whose heads were unemployed due to retrenchment had lower incomes than those with heads working in manual jobs. However, the extent of the differential fell markedly from 1995 onwards. In 1995, the differential was -46%, significant at the 1% level. This differential fell to -25% in 1999 and -17% in 2002, significant only at the 10% level.
These results suggest that over time, households with unemployed heads were more able to compensate for the loss in earnings by other means -perhaps increased welfare payments or, in 2002 when unemployment was falling, by the earnings of other members. The relative income of households whose heads were retired was also more favourable in 2002 than in earlier years: the model predicts that they have 39% higher income than households with heads in manual work, while models for earlier years predict only insignificant differences.
There has been a major change in household income differentials by industrial sector.
In 1988, there were few significant differences, ceteris paribus, in household income according to the industrial sector of the household head. The default sector, manufacturing, appeared to pay no different from most other sectors and significantly more than government administration. Urban households whose heads worked in mining and agriculture, as well as the wholesale and retail sectors had higher incomes, ceteris paribus, than households whose heads worked in manufacturing. By 2002, these differentials had all been reversed. Mining and agriculture were associated with the lowest household incomes, followed by construction, retail and wholesale services and manufacturing. Heads who worked in other sectors had significantly higher household incomes, for example, those working in government administration had 15% higher household incomes than those in manufacturing. These sectoral changes correspond to those estimated for individual wages, using the same CHIP surveys (Appleton et al., 2005) .
For brevity, we do not report the Tobit models for the full specification, preferring to concentrate instead on the probits for whether a household is not poor. There are fewer pronounced changes over time in the coefficients on job characteristics in the probits for households being non-poor than in the OLS income models. 
Conclusion
China's high economic growth is perhaps the most significant economic development in the world over the last two decades. Much of its significance has been in the improvement of rural livelihoods. Nonetheless, it also has important impacts on urban China -areas that accounted for 39% of its population (in 2002) . There has been a growing unease that this growth has been unequally shared and has led to the rise of a "new urban poverty". Sceptics concede that economic efficiency and growth may have been promoted by urban reforms involving a reduction in subsidies for urban households and retrenchment of excess employees in State Owned Enterprises.
However, there is concern that these same reforms may have increased urban poverty, by reducing transfers to low income households and inducing mass unemployment.
In this paper, we have focussed on the real incomes of urban residents at the lower end of the income distribution in urban areas. Using CHIP surveys which include state subsidies and transfers in their measurement of household income, we have shown that living standards rose across the distribution of income from 1988 to 2002. This truth has been masked by conventional analysis of urban poverty in China which defines only a very small minority of the urban population -for example, the 1% of so defined as poor by using a "dollar a day" poverty line. We find evidence that the withdrawal of subsidies between 1988 and 1995 lowered the real income of the poorest in urban areas. However, this was subsequently outweighed by growth in other sources of income. Perhaps most surprisingly, we find that -despite the rise of mass unemployment after 1995 -absolute poverty continued to fall, irrespective of where the poverty line was set. This implies that the concern that absolute poverty has risen during urban reform is misplaced. State-funded anti-poverty programs have expanded in urban China during this period, but still had very limited coverage and made little impact on poverty or inequality in this period.
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